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SEXUAL ASSAULT LEGISLATION: 
THE BALANCING ACT
Irit Weiser*
With the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' judges, lawyers 
and legislators must give express consideration to the interaction between societal 
values, fundamental rights and criminal law norms. Moreover, the Charter 
requires us to explain how we balance these sometimes competing interests and 
why we draw the line where we do. The case of R. v. Seaboyer* and the 
government’s response to it, Bill C-49,3 provide one of the best examples of this 
juggling act. I will examine this issue by discussing the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision in Seaboyer, the nature of the problem of sexual assault and its 
relationship to the Charter and criminal law.
I. R. v. Seaboyer
In Seaboyer, an accused charged with sexual assault sought to cross-examine the 
complainant on her previous sexual conduct. The accused was prevented from 
doing so by virtue of ss. 277 and 276 of the Criminal Code4 Section 277 excluded 
evidence of sexual reputation for the purpose of challenging or supporting the 
credibility of the plaintiff. Section 276 barred evidence of the complainant’s sexual 
activities subject to the following exceptions:
past sexual relations between the accused and the complainant;
evidence to rebut prosecution evidence regarding the complainant’s sexual
history,
evidence tending to establish the identity of the assailant; and
evidence regarding sexual relations which occurred on the same occasion in
support of the accused’s belief that the complainant consented.
At issue was whether the evidence excluded by ss. 277 and 276 violated the 
accused’s rights to make full answer and defence, and to a fair trial, contrary to 
ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.
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The Supreme Court of Canada held that the principles of fundamental justice 
in s. 7 of the Charter mandate certain rules concerning the exclusion of otherwise 
relevant evidence.5 Evidence sought to be introduced by the Crown will not be 
admissible if its probative effect is outweighed by its prejudice to the accused.6 
A higher standard is imposed with respect to the exclusion of evidence offered by 
the defence. Such evidence will be excluded only if its probative effect is 
substantially or clearly outweighed by the prejudice to the trial process.7
Applying this latter test to s. 277, all members of the Supreme Court held that 
evidence of past sexual conduct is never relevant to the issue of the complainant’s 
credibility or to the likelihood of consent. Therefore, exclusion of this evidence 
did not violate the accused’s rights under s. 7 of the Charter. However, the Court 
divided on the constitutionality of defence evidence excluded by s. 276. Justice 
McLachlin, writing for the majority of the Court,8 states that the exclusion was too 
broad and did not allow for the exercise of judicial discretion where necessary in 
the interests of justice. The majority expressed caution in restricting the power of 
the accused to call defence evidence because of its effect on the fundamental tenet 
of our judicial system that an innocent person must not be convicted.
In dissent, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé concluded that the evidence barred by s. 
276 was irrelevant.9 Arguments to the contrary relied on myths concerning 
women and rape.10 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé further concluded that if she were 
wrong on the issue of relevancy, exclusion was warranted because of the extreme 
prejudicial effect evidence premised on rape myths would have on the tried of the 
legal issues. Section 7 of the Charter did not entitle the accused to adduce any 
evidence which might lead to an acquittal.
sSupra, note 2 at 138. According to the Supreme Court, “[rjelevant evidence ... is evidence that in 
some degree advances the inquiry, and thus has probative value ....” (quoting from E.W. Cleary, ed., 
McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence, 2d ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1972) at 438-40). As 
a general rule, everything which is probative is admissible as evidence, unless its exclusion can be 
justified on some other ground.
‘See also R  v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 and Morris v. R  (1983), 36 C.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
1Supra, note 2 at 139-40.
®Lamer C.J.C., La Forest, Sopinka, Cory, Stevenson and Iacobucci JJ. concurred in the judgment.
9Gonthier J. concurred in the dissenting judgment.
10Supra, note 2 at 209. Moreover, according to Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, some exceptions were 
paradoxically cast too broadly permitting the admission of irrelevant evidence.
II. The Interaction Between the Problem of Sexual Assault, Charter Rights and 
Criminal Law
The judgments in Seaboyer highlighted the complex and sometimes disharmonious 
interaction between the serious societal problem of conflicting Charter interests 
and criminal law norms. Sections T il and 276 were part of a comprehensive 
package which sought to address a problem far broader than the misuse of sexual 
history evidence.
That problem concerns violence against women in general.11 Inextricably 
linked to that problem is the pervasive and negative influence of rape mythology 
on the commission of sexual assault, the subsequent investigation, prosecution, 
trial, and the application of the law. In her judgment, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé 
describes evidence which demonstrates how myths surrounding women and sexual 
assault affect perceptions of the culpability of the aggressor and the credibility of 
the complainant. She also indicates how the law has historically incorporated 
these myths by means of the doctrine of recent complaint, corroboration rules, 
exceptions for spousal assault and the relevancy of unchasteness to consent and 
credibility.
Fortunately, these rules are no longer an express part of the law of sexual 
assault. However, myths about rape continue to be reflected in judgments and 
legal texts:
Women who say no do not always mean no. It is not just a question of saying no, 
it is a question of how she says it, how she shows and makes it clear. If she 
doesn’t want it she has only to keep her legs shut and she would not get it without 
force and there would be marks of force being used.12
Modem psychiatrists have amply studied the behaviour of errant young girls and 
women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes are 
multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements 
or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment, partly by temporary 
physiological or emotional conditions. One form taken by these complexes is that 
of contriving false charges of sexual offenses by men.13
uIt is recognized that not only women are victims of sexual assault, however as noted by Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé, in the vast majority of cases such are the circumstances and the perpetrators are 
men. (98.7% of those charged with sexual assault are men): Crime Statistics 1986 (Ottawa: Centre 
for Criminal Justice Statistics, 1986) cited in supra, note 2 at 170.
12Judge David Wild, Cambridge Crown Court, 1982, quoted in E. Sheehy, “Canadian Judges and the 
Law of Rape: Should the Charter Insulate Bias?” (1989) 21 Ottawa L. Rev. 741 at 741 and cited in 
supra, note 2 at 179.
13J.H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol. 3A, rev*d J.H. Chadboum (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co., 1970) at 736, cited in supra, note 2 at 180.
As a consequence, studies indicate that sexual assault, unlike other violent 
crimes, goes largely unreported. As well, the prosecution and conviction rates for 
sexual assault are among the lowest of all violent crimes. Finally, it is worth 
emphasizing Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s observation that “the fear and constant 
reality of sexual assault affects how women conduct their lives and how they define 
their relationship with the larger society.”14
From a Charter perspective, it is fair to describe sexual assault legislation as 
a response to the s. 7 right of women to security of the person and the s. 15 right, 
complimented by s. 28, to equal benefit of the law. The right of complainants as 
a class to security of the person was recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Seaboyer.15 At the same time, an extremely important function of the Charter is 
to balance the enormous powers of the state against individuals and to ensure that 
accused are presumed innocent until proven guilty and receive a fair trial. This 
function was the basis of the majority’s decision in Seaboyer, that s. 276 of the 
Criminal Code violated ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.
Sexual assault legislation starkly highlights a conflict between different, valid, 
societal concerns. There is, on the one hand, protection of the rights of accused 
from the state and, on the other, the seriously disturbing effects of rape mythology 
on the operation of the legal system and ultimately on the security of women. The 
rights stipulated in the Charter protect and incorporate both these concerns. 
However, the decision in Seaboyer required that a different means of balancing 
them be found.
III. The Response of Bill C-49
In its response to Seaboyer, the government did not limit itself to the narrow issue 
of exclusion of sexual history evidence. Instead, it addressed the problem in its 
broader context of violence against women and the inadequacies in the legal 
system for protecting women. At the same time, it sought to assure that the rights 
of the accused were properly protected. Thus, all aspects of sexual assault 
legislation were examined.
An important aspect of the response to Seaboyer was that it involved broad 
consultations with legal, women’s and other organizations. Their input was 
fundamental to understanding the nature of the problem, particularly as it affects 
disadvantaged groups, and to developing appropriate legal responses. In the end,
14Supra, note 2 at 170.
15Ibid. at 133.
Bill C-49 contained a variety of new components, three of which are discussed 
below.
1. Exclusion of Sexual History Evidence
Under the new legislation, sexual activity evidence is admissible if it meets the 
relevancy test and if its relevance is not substantially outweighed by prejudice to 
the proper administration of justice.16 In making such a determination, trial 
judges are required to consider a series of guidelines based on those delineated 
by Justice McLachlin in Seaboyer}1 This amendment addresses the concern of 
the majority in Seaboyer that judges have discretion to allow sexual history 
evidence where necessary for the accused’s right to a fair trial.
At the same time, procedural protections for the complainant were included 
to avoid the abusive use of sexual history evidence. These protections also seek 
to assure complainants that the reporting of sexual assault will not lead to their 
own re-victimization. These procedural protections include:
a preliminary application by the accused as to the relevancy of specific sexual 
history evidence, and if the judge determines that “the evidence sought to be 
adduced is capable of being admissible,”18 the judge shall hold a hearing on 
admissibility,
the judiciary’s obligation to provide detailed reasons for their determination 
on the admissibility of sexual history evidence19 which will hopefully provide 
a means to check and challenge decisions based on rape mythology, 
the complainant is not a compellable witness,20
the public is excluded from applications and hearings on admissibility,21 and 
publication bans are imposed on all aspects of the application and hearing 
subject to two exceptions. Judges may decide their reasons are publishable 
after considering the complainant’s right to privacy and the interests of justice. 
Secondly, the judge’s reasons are published if the evidence is declared 
admissible.22
16Supra, note 3 at s. 276(2)(c).
inIbid. at s. 276(3).
18Ibid. at s. 276.1.
l9Ibid. at s. 276.2(3).
x Ibid. at s. 276.2(2).
nIbid. at ss. 276.1(3) and 276.2(1).
^Ibid. at s. 2763.
With respect to the safeguards of publication bans and in camera hearings, 
Charter issues clearly arose. The guarantee of free expression in s. 2(b) of the 
Charter has been interpreted very broadly by the Supreme Court of Canada. It 
includes the public’s right to access the judicial system and to know what 
transpires before the courts.23 If publication bans and in camera hearings are to 
be sustainable, they will likely have to be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.
However, similar safeguards have been upheld by the Supreme Court. It 
recognized that limits on free expression may be justifiable to protect a 
complainant’s privacy,24 to avoid prejudicial publicity,25 and to promote the 
proper administration of justice. This latter objective was advanced by addressing 
victims’ concerns about exposing themselves to unwanted media publicity, which 
in turn encourages victims to report crimes.26
2. Defining Consent
A second and especially important aspect of Bill C-49 is its definition of conduct 
which constitutes “consent” in sexual assault cases27 and its identification of 
situations in which consent is not possible. For example, where sexual activity 
results from abuse of a position of trust or authority, consent is impossible.28
Consent is defined in the Act as “the voluntary agreement of the complainant 
to engage in the sexual activity in question.” The central importance of this 
provision becomes clear when one considers the “theory of implied consent.” To 
date, courts generally have not required the accused to ensure that consent was 
obtained prior to sexual touching. Rather, courts have started from the premise 
that consent is present or implied in the absence of clear and unequivocal non­
consent, which usually must take the form of physical resistance.29
The continued prevalence of this theory is exemplified in two recent cases. In 
R. v. Edgar,30 the accused undressed the sleeping complainant and assaulted her. 
He was acquitted on the ground that he mistakenly believed the complainant was 
another woman. Mistake aside, the judge never considered how the accused could
^See Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.) (1989), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.).
^See ibid.; supra, note 2; Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122.
25Supra, note 2; Southam Inc. v. Coulter (1990), 75 O.R. (2d) 1 (CA.).
26Canadian Newspapers Co., supra, note 24; Edmonton Journal, supra, note 23.
27Supra, note 3 at s. 273.1(1).
^Ibid. at s. 273.1(2).
29 R. Comaviera, “The Reform of Sexual Assault Laws: Bill C-49” [unpublished].
^(1991), 10 C.R. (4th) 67 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
have obtained consent from any sleeping woman. For some reason, both the judge 
and accused presumed consent would have existed had the accused picked the 
right woman, presumably because they had earlier sexual relations. R. v. 
Letendre31 illustrates the approach to sexual assault in what is probably a far 
more common factual scenario. The accused and complainant initially met each 
other in a bar one lunch hour and then spent many hours talking. They went back 
to the complainant’s apartment around dinner time and had more drinks. The 
accused made sexual advances. She pushed him away when he tried to kiss her 
and kept on asking him why he was doing this. She said that she helped him take 
off her pants because she was scared, although he did not overtly threaten her. 
When he went to the bathroom, she fled the apartment and ran to the caretaker 
for help. The judge concluded that there had been consent. He stated that:
The mating practice ... is a less than precise relationship. At times no may mean 
maybe, or wait awhile, the acts of one of the participants may be easily 
misinterpreted, a participant may change his or her mind, one way or another part 
way through it, and co-operation as well as enjoyment may be faked for a number 
of reasons. In my opinion, in the interests of both participants, it is one which 
demands clear and unequivocal communication between the parties, particularly 
if one of them does not want to participate in it.32
The judge stated that both parties must clearly communicate consent, but in 
effect the “communication” he sought was from the complainant and it was to 
show non-consent, rather them an agreement to participate in sexual activity with 
the accused. In other words, the judge implied that consent was present on the 
part of the complainant unless she said or did enough to indicate refusal 
according to the judge’s terms. When one reads the decision in full, it is evident 
that the judge was looking for threats and physical resistance; he gave little 
credence to the argument that a complainant might not physically resist out of 
fear.
Bill C-49’s definition of consent assists in providing clarity, both for those 
initiating sexual advances and for those responding to them. More importantly, 
an express definition in legislation should render the issue of consent a question 
of law. Thus, a mistaken belief that certain conduct constitutes consent becomes 
a mistake of law rather than fact. As a general rule, mistake of law is not a 
defence to a crime. Only time will tell if this definition will assist in countering 
the problem of sexual assault.
31(1991), 5 C.R. (4th) 159 (B.C.S.C.).
32Ibid. at 173.
3. Mistaken belief must be based on reasonable steps
Prior to Bill C-49, an accused who honestly, but wrongly believed that a 
complainant was consenting to sexual activity was considered innocent. The 
reasonableness of the accused’s mistaken belief was irrelevant.33
The defence of honest mistake, when combined with the absence of a clear 
definition of consent, was especially problematic. It permitted an aggressor to 
assume consent based on a victim’s acts or attitudes which in the aggressor’s mind 
were indicative of consent (for example, an invitation in for a drink). Clearly, this 
left women vulnerable. In R. v. Weaver,34 the complainant had been very drunk 
at a party, vomited and passed out in one of the bedrooms. The accused entered 
the bedroom, spoke to the complainant and she made some response. He had 
sexual intercourse with her, returned an hour later and had sexual intercourse 
again. The complainant was so drunk that she had little recollection of the first 
instance and absolutely none of the second. The trial judge concluded that the 
complainant had clearly not consented. However, he acquitted the accused on the 
basis that he had an honest but mistaken belief in consent.
Bill C-49 alters the state of the law. Mistaken belief in consent is no longer 
a defence unless the accused took reasonable steps, in the circumstances known 
to the accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting.35 
It should be noted that this provision may not have a significant impact due to the 
addition of an express definition of consent in Bill C-49. The defence of mistaken 
belief relates to questions of fact, and because consent is now expressly defined; 
in my view, it amounts to a question of law for which there is no defence of 
mistake.
The setting of a standard which requires reasonable steps raises an issue under 
s. 7 of the Charter regarding acceptable fault levels. The standard is largely an 
objective one, except for the requirement that the trier take into account “the 
circumstances known to the accused at the time.”
The Supreme Court has clearly established that s. 7 of the Charter demands 
that some level of moral fault be an element of an offence where there is a 
potential deprivation of liberty.36 However, there has been no conclusive 
determination on the minimum level of fault required for a conviction generally,
33R. v. Pappajohn, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120. Reasonable grounds were only relevant in the assessment of 
whether the accused honestly held the belief.
^(1990), 80 C.R. (3d) 396 (Alta. CA.).
35Supra, note 3 at s. 273.2(b).
36Reference Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
nor on the precise level of fault required for particular kinds of criminal offences. 
There is a significant amount of support in the Supreme Court’s case law to 
suggest that as a general rule, where an accused faces possible imprisonment, 
objective fault or negligence is the minimum fault level.37 Thus, “reasonable 
steps,” which represents an objective or negligence standard, would not at a 
general level fall below the minimum fault requirements of the Charter.
This answer does not end the inquiry because the Supreme Court has also 
stated that for a very few Criminal Code offences, a special subjective mens rea is 
required. According to the Court, these offences are identifiable by the stigma 
associated with conviction and, to a lesser extent, the available penalties.38 To 
date, the Supreme Court has identified murder, attempted murder and 
surprisingly, theft, as offences which require proof of a subjective mens rea because 
of their special stigma.39 In contrast, the Supreme Court recently found that 
unlawfully causing bodily harm did not require subjective fault.40
In the context of Bill C-49, the issue becomes whether sexual assault is an 
offence of such stigma as to require subjective fault. Does the stigma preclude 
reliance on a “reasonable steps” standard? Lower court decisions on the question 
of stigma are varied. Stigma is an elusive concept whose application has not 
followed any clear or logical criteria. Moreover, it appears that while lip service 
continues to be paid to this notion, the Supreme Court has become increasingly 
reluctant to label offences as having special stigma.41 Consequently, I believe few 
offences will be added to the limited “stigma” crimes already identified.
In assessing the constitutionality of a “reasonable steps” standard for sexual 
assault, a number of factors are relevant. Key among these are the nature of the 
problem of sexual assault and the aim of the corrective legislation. A defence 
confined solely to “honest, even if unreasonable mistake” defines culpability 
according to the accused’s state of mind, regardless of whether the victim consents. 
Consequently, previous law effectively required women to resist, at a risk to
21 FL v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc. (1991), 84 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.) per Lamer CJ.G; R. v. Hess
(1990), 79 C.R. (3d) 332 (S.C.C.); R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636; See also ibid.
^R. v. Vaillancourt, ibid.] R. v. Martineau (1990), 79 C.R. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.). It is not clear from the 
majority decision in Martineau whether all forms of subjective mens rea (i.e. intention, knowledge, 
wilful blindness and recklessness) will satisfy s. 7 where a conviction for a stigma offence, such as 
murder, is being sought. Lamer CJ.C. states that “the stigma and punishment attaching to the most 
serious crime, murder, should be reserved for those who either intend to cause death or who intend to 
cause bodily harm that they know will likely cause death” [emphasis added]. It is not clear whether by 
this statement, Lamer CJ.C. is seeking to exclude wilful blindness and recklessness.
^R. v. Vaillancourt, supra, note 37; R. v. Martineau, ibid.; R. v. Logan (1990), 79 C.R. (3d) 169 (S.C.C.)
^R. v. DeSousa (1992), 15 C. R. (4th) 66 (S.C.C.), affg (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 152.
AlIbid.
physical safety, to relay non-consent to the accused in a manner which could hold 
the accused liable.42 As well, remember that very little is required of an 
individual to act reasonably in the context of sexual assault. If one is doubtful, 
consent can be easily ascertained through verbal inquiry. Clearly, these and other 
factors will be relevant to future judicial consideration of whether the new law is 
consistent with s. 7 of the Charter.
IV. Conclusions
Despite the outcry from some sectors concerning Bill C-49, its contents are not 
revolutionary. Definitions of consent and other procedural protections have been 
part of the law of many U.S. states for a significant number of years. The law 
alone cannot cure the problem of violence against women. It is but one 
component of a broader strategy. Other measures such as shelters, support 
systems and public education in schools and at home are essential. It was hoped 
that with the last set of amendments the problem of sexual assault would be 
alleviated. That did not happen. Time and watchful eyes will judge Bill C-49.
42E. Sheehy, supra, note 12; T. Pickard, “Culpable Mistake and Rape: Relating Mens Rea to the 
Crime” (1980) 30 U.T.LJ. 75.
